Tuesday, January 27, 2009

Awkward threesomes are never fun: more on Obama, Geithner and China

This whole thing about Tim Geithner's "currency manipulation" criticism of China really has my knickers in a bunch (to employ some ever-charming English vernacular. Proof my years in England have not been squandered). Let me tell you why.

Firstly, yes, of course China manipulates its currency (James Fallows cites the problem more as one of China's management of RMB's value than its outright manipulation. Manipulation is, indeed, quite a loaded word and politically incorrect in financial crises), but arguably so do Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Argentina and any nation that either pegs its currency, maintains a tight trading band, or oversees a "managed float" system.  Even Hong Kong, consistently ranked as the world's freest economy by the Heritage Foundation, manipulates its currency. It has to maintain its links to the U.S. dollar. So for Geithner to pinpoint China alone is not only unfair, it's irresponsible (apparently Geithner took the language from Obama's campaign website without asking anyone whether campaign slogans were now governmental policy!). 

Secondly, the U.S. needs China - economically and otherwise. You might recall that China has been the main buyer of U.S. Treasury notes. If there is to be any serious headway made on environmental or climate-change issues, too, the United States again needs China. Anyone who knows anything about anything about this issue understands the thoroughgoing importance of having Beijing on board. This is largely why the appointment of Chu (really the only other thing the Obama administration has done vis-à-vis U.S- China relations thus far -  more on that in a minute) was so important. Of course the fact that Chu is the son of Chinese immigrants contributes greatly to the significance of the appointment (it was largely celebrated in China), but more important is the work he has done in brokering U.S-China relations in the area of climate change and related issues.

That said, the United States cannot afford blunders when it comes to its relations with China; the stakes are too high. And yet the first thing America does under the new administration is blunder. This is China's first impression of the 'new' United States. During his campaign Obama (to my knowledge) did little in the way of  outlining a China policy, save but commenting that he would not purchase lead-poisoned toys for his children. With the exception of Chu's appointment and now Geithner's flap of the mouth, the Chinese have little idea as to what to expect under Obama. So much so that Obama allegedly placed a call to President Hu in an attempt to calm the waters and assure him that Geithner's misspeak will not be characteristic of U.S-China relations under his administration. I sure hope not. 

Adding insult to injury, the exchange rate is currently not the most important aspect of U.S-China relations, even given the financial crisis. While Geithner may not yet understand or recall this (maybe someone has told him by now?), the Chinese do. And they have told him (and Obama) exactly where they can put their yuan views. 

The last thing the United States should want right now is a trade war. Especially not with China. Especially.

Conflict and identity formation in sub-Saharan Africa

In earlier weeks I posted on the increasing patriotism among Iraqis and the extent to which this trend might be correlated with the scale of American military presence. A related paper by Doug Gibler, Marc Hutchinson and Steven Miller asks a similar question in sub-Saharan Africa. In their paper, they suggest that there is no straightforward relationship between conflict and identity formation. Rather, the tendency toward identity formation is contingent on the type of conflict and whether an individual belongs to the dominant ethnic group in a contested territory: 
Here we present the first cross-national, multi-level analysis of the effects of international and civil conflict on individual identity formation. Using Afrobarometer survey data from over 31,000 respondents in 16 separate sub-Saharan countries, we test our theory of how conflict affects the likelihood an individual will identify themselves as a member of their ethnic group rather than their nation. We find that international conflict exerts a strong influence on the likelihood and content of individual self-identification, but this effect varies with the type of conflict. International conflict leads the majority of individuals in targeted countries to identify themselves as citizens of their country. Individuals in countries that are initiating territorial disputes are more likely to self-identify as members of a particular ethnic group, however. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that the effect of civil conflict is inconsistent across models. Indeed, civil conflict only matters for individual identity formation when international conflict is fully specified in the multi-level model. That conflict has variegated effects on identity formation suggests the relationship between international conflict and identity formation is not endogenous. Further, the temporal controls we use to test the identity models confirm that self-identification with an ethnic group follows rather than precedes conflict. We discuss the importance of our theory and findings for the international conflict and identity literatures in some detail. 
[HT: The Monkey Cage]