While you were gone...

Dearest Readers: I apologize sincerely for the rather embarrassing lack of posting in recent days (or has it been weeks, already?). I have several writing projects on my plate at the moment (not to mention the mammoth beast that is the PhD), all of which have served to hamper my desire to blog when I manage to steal away some ever-fleeting moments of spare time. That said, I have not abandoned you and will continue to post in this space when I can (hopefully more frequently going forward!).

Now, let's get back to business, shall we? It seems that among the golden rules governing the IR world is the ever-wise maxim, "don't blink or you'll miss it." Much has happened in the way of Sino-African relations since I last wrote. To that end, I've collected a not-so-brief list of stories which have surfaced during my absence, and which I deem especially worthy of note:

• The FT last week ran a special report on Kenya. Whilst many "special reports" of such a nature have previously been written, I found this one especially well crafted and comprehensive, covering issues ranging from the country's leadership crisis to its extreme (and extremely fickle) climate
• Always sharp, always informative, Elizabeth Dickinson asks whether China's Guinea deal is for real. Emerging evidence suggests that the deal may actually amount to nothing more than wishful thinking on the part of the Guineans, though given the shroud of secrecy under which the Chinese (and by and large Guineans) operate, the actual reality of the matter is anyone's best guess. I find it perfectly typical, though: Guinea is embroiled in turmoil and gross human rights violations; the international community is ready to impose sanctions; and China is soldering on with its oil and investment deals. Where have we seen this before?
• Unsurprisingly, an increasing body of experts are calling for heightened transparency in China's Africa investments. I wouldn't be surprised if Beijing will over time begin declassifying a select pool of documents surrounding its African activities - not because it will have suddenly decided to operate within the international regulatory framework, but for the very reason that by appeasing Western demands in this regard it will be able to continue doing as it pleases. Give a little, take a lot seems to be the name of the game.
• In the name of fairness, however, if one is to be critical of the Chinese for their African oil investments, one should seemingly be equally condemnatory of the Bush family....
• A sad twist of irony in our technologically advanced world: phones appear to be more widespread than food. Might we - in our constant pursuit of all things bigger, better and faster - be losing sight of the basic needs of the world's poor? Food for thought (no pun intended)
• An interesting glance into the DRC's 2009 budget (HT: Texas in Africa). As Texas in Africa aptly notes, the best thing about the budget is how easy it is to see where the money is being stolen. The whole thing reads quite like a satirical novella. Well, almost.
• The 2009 Forum on China Africa Cooperation is due to take place in Egypt on 8-9 November. I look forward to reading the newly revised China Africa strategy which, I'm quite certain, will read exactly like the old one
• A most harrowing account of human rights violations in North Korea from The Economist. While North Korea is generally discussed solely in terms of its nuclear ambitions and contentious behavior on the international stage, one often forgets of the country's population, which is suffering under the most atrocious and deplorable conditions
• On the near-eve of the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, Brahma Chellaney puts 1989 in global comparative perspective: Europe got freedom, Asia got rich. And, twenty years later, China's authoritarian capitalism stands to challenge the global spread of democratic values. How much happens in such a short period of history.

A market for aid?

In his new essay on aid, Owen Barder argues that policies to improve aid have - and continue to - rely too much on a planning paradigm that attempts to ignore, rather than change, the political economy of aid:

It is tempting to conclude that the answer is for donors to defer to the leadership of developing country governments, especially given the commitments to this in the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action. But that assumes away the problem. The balance of power between donors and recipients converges on an equilibrium which balances the various interests of the givers and receivers of aid, and the implementing agents. If we find this equilibrium unsatisfactory, we have to change the determinants of the equilibrium, not simply try to move away from it.

Barder posits a combination of market mechanisms, networked collaboration and collective regulation as more likely to herald the desired results than the hitherto pursued policy approaches. Such coordination, he argues, can improve accountability, reduce information asymmetries, and reduce principal-agent problems currently faced by donor agencies. In so doing, they can help to change the political economy of aid, and so move the political equilibrium.

Arguably Barder's most controversial suggestion is the unbundling of funding from aid management to create more explicit markets for aid delivery. What this means in practice is opening up contracts to competition among a range of aid delivery agencies, both public and private. Such competition could lead to greater specialisation and division of labour, incentives to define and measure results, etc.

The UNDP (among countless such aid agencies, to be sure!) must be reeling. What are your thoughts?

(PS. For more from Owen have a look at his blog, found here)

Where have all the (good) African leaders gone?

It would seem that there are no worthwhile (past) African leaders in the entirety of Africa.

The Mo Ibrahim Foundation, established on the premise of improving the quality of governance across the continent, has for the past several years awarded the African Leadership Prize to previous leaders who have done well to support the cause of good governance in their respective countries. This year no such prize was awarded. While Ibrahim claims that there are "no issues of disrespect" surrounding the decision, it nevertheless comes as quite a low blow, especially to the likes of Mbeki and Kufour who - while no doubt boasting highly dubious governance records - were the likely contenders.

Aside from a nice pat on the back, however, the effectiveness of the prize (if the conferring of a prize can indeed be effective) is questionable. The general idea underpinning the award is that by singling out previous statesmen who supported democracy, the rule of law, and all other such things that have come to be lumped under the general notion of 'governance,' sitting leaders will be encouraged to act similarly. Yet, as the BBC rightly points out, this doesn't at all seem to be the case:

Uganda, Chad and Cameroon have all changed their constitutions so their leaders can retain their positions.

There have been coups in Guinea, Mauritania and Madagascar, as well as several elections that fell well short of international standards. And the countries that have received most praise from Mo Ibrahim's foundation this year - Mauritius, Cape Verde and Seychelles - are far from the continent's centres of power.

That being said, perhaps withholding the prize this year sends a different, much more apt message: work harder.

Learning Chinese in Liberia

Surely a sign of the times: Chinese officials operating in Liberia are offering free Chinese language lessons to young Liberians - and anyone keen to learn the language more generally:

As in much of Africa, China is heavily engaged in post-war Liberia, rebuilding roads with funding from the World Bank, managing hotels and restaurants, trading in medicines and other businesses.

Chinese mineral firm China Union became the largest investor in Liberia when it signed a $2.6bn deal to go into iron-ore mining earlier this year. There is even a Chinese-language radio station broadcasting across the country for the increasing number of migrant workers and expatriates.

The growing trade ties explain why the Chinese embassy and the Ministry of Youth and Sports have decided to put on free two-hour classes in the afternoon, five days a week.

While some may tout such lessons as an exercise in colonialism (an argument which many Liberians are likely to put forward themselves), such skills training may in fact be the harbinger of increased opportunity for the country's citizens, allowing them not only greater mobility in terms of movement to China, but also enabling them to eventually communicate with the Chinese thereby engaging in more meaningful business negotiations. Perhaps I'm feeling exceptionally optimistic this morning, or perhaps the Chinese are actually (finally?) working towards making their "mutually beneficial" partnership with Liberia precisely just that.

Noteworthy...

• CNOOC wants a stake in Ghana's oil field. So does Exxon Mobil. A showdown in the making...
• Anti-Chinese sentiment appears to be escalating in the DRC. The Chinese firm Sinohydro suffered an attack earlier this month by unidentified gunmen. This is unfortunately one among a growing number of such instances in the DRC
• "Conservative Egyptian lawmakers have called for a ban on imports of a Chinese-made kit meant to help women fake their virginity and one scholar has even called for the 'exile' of anyone who imports of uses it." And here you thought China was engaged in resource extraction alone...
• Yet another reason why I'm skeptical that China will ever do anything about North Korea. *Sigh*
• Last week the Mo Ibrahim Foundation released its annual index of governance in Africa. You can find the rankings here, and several of Elizabeth Dickinson's reflections here
• China is in a push for Guinea's resources - minerals and [the hope of] oil. Guinea is one of the poorest states in West Africa, with a seriously dubious human rights and governance record.
• The Gates Foundation is exploring securitizing aid. Securitization seems to be a dirty word these days, but Gates may be onto something...

China becomes South Africa's top export destination

From Friday's Reuters:

China overtook the United States as South Africa's biggest export destination in the first half of 2009, reinforcing the Asian country's push to build trade links with Africa.

South African trade and industry department data also showed on Friday China replaced Germany as its largest country trade partner.

[...] Data for South Africa -- Africa's biggest economy -- showed exports to China stood at 27.6 billion rand for the year to June, against 35.8 billion rand for the whole of 2008. Exports to the U.S. were 19.1 billion rand compared with 66.5 billion rand for 2008.

Don't get on their bad side...

Yesterday's FT had a fascinating piece about China's lesser-known (though absolutely no less important!) Central Organisation Department:

To glean a sense of the dimensions of the organisation department’s job, conjure up a parallel body in Washington. The imaginary department would oversee the appointments of US state governors and their deputies; the mayors of big cities; heads of federal regulatory agencies; the chief executives of General Electric,ExxonMobil, Walmart and 50-odd of the remaining largest companies; justices on the Supreme Court; the editors of The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal and The Washington Post, the bosses of the television networks and cable stations, the presidents of Yale and Harvard and other big universities and the heads of think-tanks such as the Brookings Institution and the Heritage Foundation.

Such continued adherence to a distinctly authoritarian political system is among the many reasons I don't see China evolving into a 'Western-style' democracy anytime in the near future. It furthermore presents a significant hurdle to the formation of genuine strategic partnerships between China and the West, which consists primarily of democracies.

It's the oil, stupid

Following on yesterday's post about China's pursuit of Nigerian oil, the CS Monitor today has an interesting piece on why China is unlikely to support sanctions on Iran - even if today's US-Iran talks go badly (which many suspect they will). The bottom line: oil, of course! China imports nearly 15% of its crude oil from Iran, and has recently started selling refined gasoline to Iran. What's more:

Chinese state-owned oil companies have signed three multi-billion dollar deals with Iran this year to develop oil and gas fields there, in a bid to establish a strategic hold over resources not under the control of Western oil firms.

"Iran has bountiful energy resources, its natural gas reserves are the second largest in the world, and all are basically under its own control," former Chinese ambassador to Tehran Sun Bigan wrote in the latest issue of "Asia and Africa Review," published by a prominent government think tank.

China also became a partner this year in a proposed pipeline carrying gas from Iran to Pakistan. Since India dropped out of the project, the pipe is now due to carry gas north from Pakistan into China, indicating Beijing's strategic vision of its future energy supplies.

As I've noted on countless previous occasions, China is in many respects the classic textbook case of realist politics, with primacy placed on its national interests and security over all other matters and considerations. It comes as little surprise, then, that Beijing remains unwilling to crack down on Tehran: Tehran has what Beijing wants and needs, and the Chinese will be damned if anything gets in the way of that. If you're waiting for Chinese sanctions on any oil-exporting country, you may be waiting a while...

China goes after Nigeria's oil

Via Tom Burgis writing in the FT:

A Chinese state-owned oil company is in talks with Nigeria to buy large stakes in some of the world’s richest oil blocs in a deal that would eclipse Beijing’s previous efforts to secure crude overseas.

The attempt could pitch the Chinese into competition with western oil groups, including Shell, Chevron, Total and ExxonMobil, which partly or wholly control and operate the 23 blocks under discussion. Sixteen licences are up for renewal.

Most prominently, CNOOC is hoping to buy 6 billion barrels of oil, equivalent to one in every six barrels of proven reserves in Nigeria. While the overall value of the offer has not been disclosed, some sources suggest that it caps somewhere around the $50 billion mark. Another issue yet to be disclosed is that of how the Nigerian government plans to allocate equity in the oil blocks; some suspect that it may involve forcing western groups to relinquish their stakes. Bring on the fireworks.

Noteworthy...

Hello (!), and thanks very much for being so patient while I transitioned back to an Oxonian existence. I'm nearly all settled and on something resembling a routine, which is quite exciting. Research productivity is still a matter to be tackled, but I'm getting there... slowly, slowly.

News while I was away? - Lots, really! Below is a little collection of stories which caught my attention when I finally sat down to catch-up on the world's goings-on. These are but several among many, to be sure:

• Owen Barder on when innovative finance is good for development - and when it isn't
• Despite China's rapid economic rebound in recent months, many Chinese companies are still operating at a lower level of activity than they had achieved in the boom years
• American chicken feet may be the US's saving grace in its recent (and ongoing) trade war with China
• Nestle is in a bit of a bind as it has been discovered that the company purchases milk from a Zimbabwean farm seized from its white owners and now owned by Mugabe's wife. Now that's a "whoops" moment if I ever saw one...
• The 24 September edition of the Economist had a wonderful special report on the positive potential of mobile money in Africa
• Writing in the European Voice, Jonathan Holslag and Gustaaf Geeraerts argue that Europe should expect to see a more assertive China in the coming years
• A rather biting review of Paul Collier's book, Wars, Guns & Votes written by Dr. Mutuma Ruteere, Research Fellow at the University of Cape Town. The review is written from an anti-imperialist, anti-interventionist tone; certainly worth your time

Signing off for a bit...

I'm moving back to Oxford on Wednesday and am taking the next few weeks off from blogging to get my ducks in a row and myself on some sort of schedule. If a major event occurs somewhere in the world, I will try to ween myself away from duvet shopping, house keeping, haggling with British banks and Ph.D brainstorming - whatever will happen to be occupying my time - to write a proper commentary. Assuming such a thing won't be necessary, regular posting will resume in early October.