Tuesday, July 7, 2009

China's ethnic turmoil

When we talk about polities marred by ethnic divisions and unequal modernization and economic growth, China is often not the first country that comes to mind. One is perhaps more inclined to picture a Nigeria or a Sudan, for instance. Yet ethnic tensions have been and remain among the defining features of the Middle Kingdom, which is why the recent unrest is rather unsurprising, though nevertheless quite upsetting.


From what I've been able to gather, no one appears to know exactly what triggered the Uighur violence. While some blame it on exiled Uighur Rebiya Kadeer, others suggest the violence was triggered by a brawl which took place in factory several weeks ago and has since escalated. Naturally, leaders in Beijing blame the West for masterminding the whole thing, though I find little basis for such accusations if for no other reason than the simple fact that the West has little political or strategic interest in China's Muslim community. There were/are twenty-two Uighurs captive in Gitmo, though I doubt the protests have anything to do with this. Rather, the strife seems to be a purely domestic matter, with a historically marginalized sector of the populace acting out against state policies that continue to leave them on the periphery of economic growth, especially since large numbers of Han Chinese have moved into the traditionally Muslim province and are usurping jobs from resident Uighurs.


Of course this is no justification for such awful acts of violence. Since the Uighur riots began on Sunday, 156 individuals have been killed and over 1,400 arrested in what is said to be the worst ethnic violence since the Cultural Revolution. Despite the fact that the population in Xinjiang comprises less than 1.5% of China's overall population, the State is heavily cracking down on the violence so as to preserve the "stability of the state," which is another way of saying 'One China'.


It is important to remember that Beijing's 'One China' policy is directed not only at Tibet and Taiwan, but any separatist movements, of which the Uighurs in Xinjiang are one. Many Chinese likewise uphold the notion of 'One China' which adds yet another element of complexity to the ongoing protests. One could say that the Uighurs are protesting against their marginalization and (perhaps symbolically) for separation, while the Han Chinese are protesting against the protests and for One China. In a curious way, these protests call into question the very notion of Han nationalism, which has long been regarded as a sort of ideological superglue holding together a united China. I seriously question the strength of this glue to begin with, but it seems to be wearing off - if it was even there to begin with.


As with the ongoing turmoil in Iran, the outcome of the unrest in Xinjiang is unclear. Fresh demonstrations have started in the capital Urumqi despite ongoing internet restrictions aimed at quelling the violence. Yet it does seem unlikely that all of this will amount to much. The government in Beijing certainly isn't likely to change its policies, and I don't know that the Uighurs are powerful enough as a group to continue with their tactics in the face of a powerful State. As was the case with 2008 Tibetan unrest, I sense that the protests may go on for a little while longer until the costs of violence will outweigh the benefits and all will be calm (at least on the exterior) once again. After all, the 60th anniversary of the Chinese Communist takeover is fast approaching and the CCP has other matters to tend to. Dealing with an ethnic minority who resents the loss of its culture, freedom and the ability to determine its future is not one of them.


photo credit: UK Times

Development in dangerous places (aka a symposium on Paul Collier and his policies)

In the July/August issue of Boston Review one can find Paul Collier's essay on development in dangerous places (which appears to be a fantastic cut-and-paste exercise from both The Bottom Billion and Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places), along with a host of commentary from the likes of William Easterly, Nancy Birdsall and Larry Diamond, among others.


Easterly for one is not particularly pleased, neither with Collier's policy prescriptions nor the means by which he arrives at them:

I have been troubled by Paul Collier’s research and policy advocacy for some time. In this essay he goes even further in directions I argued were dangerous in his previous work. Collier wants to de facto recolonize the “bottom billion,” and he justifies his position with research that is based on one logical fallacy, one mistaken assumption, and a multitude of fatally flawed statistical exercises.


[...] Collier’s convoluted stories are made up after the fact to fit whatever random collection of data points he is working with at the moment. So the specious rationalizations keep changing—too bad for those who took the precise recommendations in The Bottom Billion as gospel.

Larry Diamond adopts a more cautionary tone, stressing the salience of governance as a key to development:

None of these endemically poor countries can climb out of misery without better governance. Collier appreciates this, but he does not fully grasp the vital distinction between Asia’s developmental dictatorships and Africa’s dictatorial disasters. The classic authoritarian Asian tigers—Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia—all had near-death experiences with communism that led them to realize it was time to “develop or die. [...] Whatever their other faults, all of these countries’ ruling elites (and later the regimes in China and Vietnam) came to identify their own political interests with generating the public goods necessary for transformative development.


I strongly endorse Collier’s appeal for a much more serious and sustained international commitment to reinforce or guarantee security and peace in the world’s most fragile and miserable states. [...] However, I cannot go along with Collier’s suggestion that we implicitly threaten to tolerate a military coup against a civilian leader who has stolen an election. How would that have made Kenya or Nigeria better off? [...] The answer to any unconstitutional seizure of power—whether by a civilian in a rigged election or a soldier in a coup—is cutting off international aid; targeted sanctions against the overseas personal assets and travel options of the power-usurper, his family, and supporters; and a credible threat of indictment and prosecution by the International Criminal Court for predatory corruption, which should be made a crime against humanity—for that is surely what it is.

Much more commentary, criticism and insights may be found at the Boston Review link.


[HT: Marginal Revolution]


PS. Don't call Collier's policies colonialist...